Can the Other Driver's Lawyer Talk to My Doctor in a Washington Injury Lawsuit?

Updated October 7, 2026: The discussion below reflects review of the October 1 opinion and linked authorities on October 7.

Generally, not through a private interview with your nonparty treating doctor outside the permitted channels. Washington’s Loudon rule restricts these “ex parte” contacts: private communications between opposing defense counsel and your treating doctor without your knowledge and consent. Formal discovery remains available, and lawful discovery is not subject to a blanket consent veto.

Here, “the insurance lawyer” means the lawyer defending the other driver—not your own insurer or your own lawyer. This article addresses Washington injury litigation, not every medical-information request after a crash.

On October 1, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the rule in Snyder v. Virginia Mason Medical Center. Snyder was a medical-malpractice case, not an auto-insurance ruling. Its relevance is its explanation of the broader personal-injury doctrine.

The essentials:

• Relevant medical evidence can be discoverable without allowing unrestricted private interviews.
• Formal discovery and contact with your knowledge and consent are separate paths.
• A violation can justify court relief, but it does not mean you automatically win.

Private interviews are different from formal discovery

The Loudon rule protects more than a privilege label

In Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wn.2d 675 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court prohibited ex parte defense interviews with treating physicians despite waiver of the physician-patient privilege.

The concerns were practical: private conversations could reach unrelated medical information, affect the treatment relationship, and leave no formal record of what was said. The rule addresses how information is obtained, not simply whether some medical evidence may be disclosed.

Relevant medical evidence can still be obtained

A deposition or properly obtained records are different from an informal private interview. Washington Civil Rule 26 provides a discovery framework subject to applicable rules, relevance, and privilege limits. That does not make every discovery method available directly against a nonparty doctor.

Snyder identifies formal discovery or communication with the plaintiff’s knowledge and consent as permitted paths (majority pp. 29, 40). Permission for an informal conversation is not the same issue as compliance with lawful discovery.

For the larger procedural picture, see the discovery stage of a Washington injury lawsuit.

What the October 1 Snyder decision actually decided

In Snyder v. Virginia Mason Medical Center, No. 104136-5, filed October 1, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed challenged communications in a medical-malpractice lawsuit involving the hospital and a surgeon.

The communications involved treating surgeons who no longer worked for the hospital. The hospital had obligations to defend and indemnify them. Their procedural positions were not identical throughout the dispute: one doctor later intervened in the case.

The hospital offered several reasons why the contacts should be allowed, including contractual obligations, corporate attorney-client privilege, potential fault, and common legal interests. The majority concluded that those theories did not justify the challenged ex parte communications on this record. The contacts violated Loudon (majority pp. 22–29, 40).

This was review of communications, remedies, and discovery issues while the case was ongoing—not a verdict deciding malpractice liability. Nor did it decide an automobile insurer’s policy obligations or claim-handling duties.

For someone injured in a crash, the useful point is narrower. Snyder describes Loudon as governing defendants’ communications with plaintiffs’ nonparty doctors in personal-injury cases (majority pp. 1–2, 15–18). Its hospital-specific analysis does not become an auto-policy rule simply because an insurer may be funding a driver’s defense.

Does putting your injuries at issue open the door to private interviews?

Not by itself. Three questions need to stay separate:

1. Privilege: Is particular medical information protected from disclosure, or does an exception or waiver apply?
2. Method: Is the defense using a permitted way to obtain that information?
3. Scope: Is the information sought within the permissible bounds of discovery?

RCW 5.60.060(4) addresses physician-patient testimonial privilege and includes exceptions. It is not a complete statement of every medical-confidentiality protection.

An injury lawsuit can make medical information discoverable without making an entire medical history fair game. And waiver of testimonial privilege does not, by itself, authorize unrestricted private interviews. That distinction runs through Loudon and Snyder (majority pp. 15–29). Neither total secrecy nor unlimited access is an accurate description.

Important limits: this is not a ban on every doctor conversation

Snyder preserves a narrow corporate attorney-client exception for qualifying communications with current employees or functional equivalents. It requires direct knowledge of relevant events, communications about the allegedly negligent incident, and satisfaction of the actual privilege requirements—not unrestricted discussion of medical histories.

The court did not extend that exception merely because former employees were owed defense or indemnity. It expressly left open whether advance court permission could allow privileged contact with former employees (majority pp. 18–29, especially footnote 8). That question remains unresolved in the decision.

Doctors may consult their own lawyers. The ruling also does not invalidate every common-interest arrangement; it rejected the justification offered on this record.

This article does not resolve pre-suit investigations, releases, or your own insurer’s PIP, UM/UIM, coverage, or cooperation requirements. Those issues should not be answered by treating Snyder as a blanket restriction on insurer requests.

If you learn opposing counsel contacted your doctor

Start by preserving communications already available to you and discussing the report with your lawyer. A report that “a lawyer called” does not establish whether a violation occurred.

Useful questions for counsel include:

• Who contacted whom, and what role did the doctor have in the case?
• Was this formal discovery or a private interview?
• What knowledge and consent existed, and was there an applicable court order?

Your lawyer can evaluate whether a protective order or another remedy is appropriate. Under CR 26(c), protective orders depend on good cause and the circumstances; protection is not automatic.

Snyder explains that a Loudon violation creates a presumption of prejudice. A plaintiff need not prove actual litigation impact merely to obtain relief. But the remedy remains case-specific. The Supreme Court vacated the denial of default and sent that issue back for reconsideration—it did not enter default or award damages (majority pp. 33–36, 40).

These practical steps are about preserving information and obtaining advice, not obstructing discovery, coaching a doctor, or refusing insurer cooperation. If you need help with a Vancouver crash claim, a case-specific review can address which rules apply to the reported contact.

Frequently asked questions

Does Snyder mean my own insurance company cannot request medical information?

No such conclusion follows. Snyder did not decide first-party insurance duties, medical releases, or pre-suit claim requests. A request from your own insurer raises different questions from an opposing lawyer’s private interview during litigation.

Can the defense still depose my treating doctor?

Formal discovery remains available subject to applicable rules. The restriction on private contact does not give a plaintiff a blanket right to veto lawful discovery. Whether a particular request is proper depends on its method, scope, and the circumstances.

Do I automatically win if defense counsel violates the rule?

No. A violation can support court-ordered relief, but it does not automatically establish liability or require default, exclusion of evidence, a new trial, or damages. The trial court must determine the appropriate remedy.

Educational information only, not legal advice.

Primary sources

• Snyder v. Virginia Mason Medical Center, No. 104136-5 (Wash. Oct. 1, 2026). References above use the majority’s separately numbered slip-opinion pages.
• Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wn.2d 675, 675–82 (1988).
• RCW 5.60.060(4): physician-patient testimonial privilege.
• Washington CR 26(a)–(c): discovery and protective orders.